Showing posts with label Dam Safety. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dam Safety. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 13, 2013

Albert Town Hit Hardest If Dam Fails

Albert Town hit hardest if dam fails
By Sarah Marqet, on Tuesday 13 August 2013
Otago Daily Times

If the Lake Hawea Control Dam were to fail, up to 420 properties and 2620 people could be affected, a Contact Energy-commissioned report says.

The September 2011 report outlines potential consequences of a dam failure and was required as part of the energy company's standard practice, not because of any concerns with the dam.

It has been made public now due to its inclusion in the agenda for the Clutha Management Committee meeting on Friday.

Albert Town, situated at the confluence of the Hawea and Clutha Rivers, would be the town most affected, with possibly 158 to 230 properties, two hotels and a campsite flooded.

However, providing a breach of the dam was noticed when it first happened, there would be a three-hour window before the flood waters reached the town, allowing time for evacuation.

Depending on initial water levels in Lake Wanaka, there could also be extensive damage through Wanaka town with 60 buildings, including hotels, cafes and a supermarket, affected.

Because of the large storage capacity of Lake Wanaka, it would be three days before the peak level was reached.

Three bridges across the Hawea and Clutha Rivers would probably be destroyed by the flood but the one on State Highway 8B at Cromwell would not.

The ''flood wave'' travel time from Lake Hawea to the upper reaches of Lake Dunstan would be seven hours, allowing plenty of warning time for Contact Energy to increase the flow of water through the Clyde Dam to lower the level of the lake.

The Clyde Dam is 94km downstream of the Hawea dam.

Water would flow over the top of the Clyde Dam (overtopping) for up to 26 hours, but it had been designed to withstand this.

Severe bank and river bed erosion could occur, as could deposits of debris due to the ''heavily wooded banks''.

The report, by AECOM New Zealand Ltd, used two dam-failure scenarios - an earthquake-induced failure and a failure induced by high lake levels following a ''probable maximum flood event''.
It was the latter failure that would cause the most damage.

The Lake Hawea Control Dam is an earth-fill dam. The report says failures of that kind of dam are ''extremely rare but have occurred in the past as the result of internal erosion or overtopping''.

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Saturday, August 21, 2010

ORC Concern Over Dam Safety Rules

ORC concern over dam safety rules
By Rebecca Fox, on Saturday 21 August 2010
Otago Daily Times

The Otago Regional Council does not think dam owners are capable of managing safety under a more relaxed regulatory regime.

A new dam safety scheme, due to have come into effect in July, was delayed to allow for an independent review after concerns about its potential compliance costs.

That review found the scheme was needed but required modifying to improve its efficiency and reduce compliance costs.

It also recommended the definition of a large dam be increased, eliminating an estimated 36% of "low-impact dams" from the requirements of the scheme.

The Department of Building and Housing consulted on the review, receiving 33 submissions, including one from the Otago Regional Council.

It would now analyse the submissions and report back to Government in the next month "or so" with advice on which recommendations should be implemented, a department spokesman said.

The regional council has been the building consent authority responsible for dams in Otago since May 2008 and for dams in Southland and the West Coast from July 2008.

In its submissions on the proposed changes, the council said dam owners had not demonstrated to the council they would be "capable of responsibly managing safety" under a more relaxed regulatory regime.

"Further experience shows that the industry is not meeting regulatory requirements that have existed under the Building Act for almost two decades."

Council environmental engineering and natural hazards director, Gavin Palmer, said in an interview dam safety was very important, as unlike most other structures, the effects of any failure would be felt off-site.

"Its an important issue . . . for anybody who lives downstream of a dam . . . who is thinking of buying property."

At present, there was a "vacuum" in the power available to the council to act if it had concerns about the "integrity" of a dam, although it did if there was immediate danger, he said.

Under the scheme as it stood, dam owners would have had to inform the council of their ownership, but with the proposed reduction in size, there would be no legal requirement for owners of smaller dams to do so.

"It makes it hard to assess the scale of the problem."

As to the suggestion of centralising the dam safety scheme functions, the council only believed it would work if central government took on all the Building Act dam responsibilities.

Otherwise, it was comfortable with the requirements to stay with regional councils.

"It's really important it is done as a coherent whole."

The Department of Building and Housing said the review recommended the authorities administering the dam safety scheme should have the power to deal with risky "smaller" dams.

This power would enable dams that would not otherwise be in the scheme to be managed, he said.

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Monday, August 16, 2010

Call For Regulation On Dam Safety

Call For Regulation For Dam Safety
Monday, 16 August 2010
Radio NZ

Campaigners say tougher regulation is needed to ensure dangerous dams are shut down.

Unlike most other developed countries, New Zealand has no specific dam safety laws.

Regulation was due to come into force in July, but was put on hold by the Government after dam owners raised concerns about compliance costs.

An independent safety review, commissioned by the Government, was subsequently carried out and concluded some dams are neglected and need to be decommissioned.

It found an urgent need for better monitoring, but recommended focusing on large dams to reduce red tape.

Clutha River Forum coordinator Lewis Verduyn says regulation is long overdue and should not be watered down.

He says thousands of people live and work in the hazard path of dams, and it is not fair that dam owners can avoid regulatory oversight.

The chairperson of the Wild Rivers campaign, Debs Martin from Forest and Bird, says it's not just people under threat, but sensitive habitats like estuaries.

She was living in South Canterbury when the Opuha dam collapsed in 1997 discharging 13 million cubic metres of water, causing millions of dollars of damage and killing about 1000 stock.

Ms Martin says decisions about dams are too critical to leave to cash-strapped regional councils and national oversight is needed.

The Department of Building and Housing says the proposed dam safety scheme is about planning to avoid a rare event.

Spokesperson Craig Hill says that, while there has not been any legal requirement for inspections, most large dam owners carry out comprehensive monitoring.

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Monday, August 9, 2010

Dam Safety Regime Delay Controversial

Dam safety regime delay controversial
By Colin Williscroft, on Monday 9 August 2010
Otago Daily Times

A Clutha River lobby group worried about way the safety of large dams in New Zealand is monitored is dismayed a proposed new dam-safety scheme has been delayed.

A scheme was due to come into effect on July 1 but was deferred, in the wake of an independent review.

Building and construction Minister Maurice Williamson said the two-year delay would allow time for the review's recommendations to be fully considered and any legislative amendments made.

That drew fire from the Clutha River Forum, which said a national safety scheme was long overdue and until one was implemented, large dam safety in New Zealand depended on the public having "blind faith" in dam owners.

Lewis Verduyn

Forum chairman Lewis Verduyn called for a independent dam safety authority to be established sooner rather than later, as large dam owners had too much autonomy for safety checks.

"They do their own inspections and there is no guarantee those inspections are accurate.

"They employ their own inspectors and we have to rely on them," he said.

"During the consultation for the review, one SOE even suggested that large corporate dam owners should be exempted from the safety scheme.

"Considering that large dams are potentially the most dangerous, this attitude is alarming, to say the least."

Countries such as the United States had a independent authority to oversee dam safety and New Zealand needed to follow that example, Mr Verduyn said.

Dam safety in New Zealand is the responsibility of regional authorities.

Pioneer Generation engineer Peter Mulvihill, of Alexandra, said an independent authority was just one proposal identified in the review.

Mr Mulvihill, vice-president of the International Committee on Large Dams and member of the working group studying proposals, said while such an authority gave an opportunity to provide consistent safety standards, similar bodies overseas had mixed experiences.

"We're not behind the rest of the world.

"We have a lot of responsible dam owners who have a really good record of looking after dams with state-of-the-art safety standards."

Mr Williamson said the delay was to ensure what was implemented was effective and efficient: "The current proposed safety regime is overly costly and complex and has the potential to force owners of small farm dams in remote areas to follow the same processes as owners of big hydro-electric dams," he said.

"Following an independent review of the proposed scheme, we are now planning to revise it to ensure dams that pose a higher risk and therefore need specific safety plans, are more clearly identified.

"I want to make sure we get the right level of risk management without imposing unnecessary costs."

The Department of Building and Housing is taking submissions on the Dam Safety Review.

Submissions close on Friday.

More...

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

NZ Dam Safety Depends On 'Blind Faith'

NZ Dam Safety Depends On 'Blind Faith'
Clutha River Forum, Wednesday, 4 August 2010, 9:24 am
Scoop.co.nz

The Clutha River Forum, an alliance of environmental groups opposed to further dams on the Clutha River, is concerned that New Zealand’s long-awaited Dam Safety Scheme has been deferred.

The scheme was due to come into effect on 1 July 2010, but the Minister of Building and Construction, Maurice Williamson, says it will be delayed for two years following a report earlier this year which found that the scheme imposed rules and compliance costs on dam owners ‘out of proportion to the risks’ imposed on New Zealanders.

“Unlike most other developed countries, New Zealand does not have a ‘Dam Safety Authority’, says Lewis Verduyn, Forum Spokesperson, and Chairperson of the Clutha Mata-Au River Parkway Group. “Thousands of people live and work in the hazard paths of dams, and yet dam safety in New Zealand depends on the public having blind faith in dam owners.”

The report, which was released by the Department of Building and Housing, recommends a number of changes to the scheme, which would regulate the safety of an estimated 1150 dams. But the Clutha River Forum believes that some critical issues have not been addressed.

“The report doesn’t acknowledge that overtopping events are a leading cause of dam failures,” says Dr. Richard Kohler, Chairperson of the Central Otago Environmental Society. “When it comes to dam safety, reservoir-related risks such as landslide areas and active fault-lines are just as important as the dams themselves. Rainfall and earthquakes can trigger catastrophic landslides and overtopping waves, and sediment-filled reservoirs can cause devastating floods. Both Clutha dams have reservoir risk factors, however the report recommends that all reference to ‘earthquake-prone and flood-prone dams’ be removed from the Act.”

There are two large concrete dams on the Clutha River. The Roxburgh dam was commissioned in 1956, and has been blamed for serious floods in Alexandra because of reservoir sedimentation. It was re-consented in 2007 for a further 35 years. The Clyde dam was commissioned in 1992 after years of controversy arising from complex fault-line and landslide mitigation issues.

Mr. Verduyn says “Although the review acknowledges that dams degrade over time, there is no mention of criteria to establish when and how dams and reservoirs are decommissioned, when the risks they impose become unacceptable and cannot be fully mitigated. Large concrete dams have a design life of 80-100yrs, but reservoirs trap sediment from eroding catchments, usually reducing this lifespan. Dams older than 50 years with known issues, like the Roxburgh dam, should have decommissioning timetables. Forward planning is needed because the impacts and costs are substantial.”

According to a report by SPX Consultants, ‘Reversibility of Renewable Energy Developments’, released in 2008, decommissioning and river restoration costs for a large dam, as a proportion of construction costs, are between 35% and 150%.

Last year, Contact Energy, the owner of the Clutha dams, dusted off historic plans for four more large dams on the Clutha River.

“The Clutha River Forum,” says Lewis Verduyn, “is firmly opposed to further dams on the Clutha River. Large dams are a gamble and it’s time that we recognised the serious risks that they impose on communities. New Zealand needs a credible ‘Dam Safety Authority’ that can enforce safety baselines and hold dam owners accountable for the impacts of their dams.”

The Clutha River Forum is an alliance of:
Upper Clutha River Guardians, Clutha Mata-Au River Parkway Group, Central Otago Environmental Society (Save Central), Beaumont Residents Group, Lower Clutha River Guardians, Forest & Bird (Dunedin / Central – Lakes), and concerned individuals throughout Otago and New Zealand.

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Clyde Dam Highly Problematic

Since the filling of the Dunstan reservoir behind the Clyde dam was completed in 1993, the Clyde dam controversy has faded in the minds of most New Zealanders. But the woes of the last 'think big' project have not gone away. Despite extensive and costly mitigation measures, issues remain regarding gorge instability, faultlines, and reservoir sediment build-up.

The Cairmuir-Dunstan Fault cuts across the gorge just above the dam, and the River Channel Fault disects the dam and the powerhouse. The discovery of the River Channel Fault came as a surprise to dam workers, who uncovered the micro-fractured rock running in a wide band along the riverbed. Obviously, fissured rock is not suitable for dam foundations. The first solution was to pump vast amounts of slurry concrete into the fault, but concerns mounted over the extent and depth of the faultline, and the likely futility of 'dental' concrete.

Finally, experts were called in to determine the extent of the fault issue. It was calculated that the River Channel Fault was 12-15km deep. This lead to a dam re-design in 1982 (during which a sluice channel was omitted leading to later modifications that reduced the dam's MW output by one-third). Subsequent investigations carried out by a team of some 40 geologists revealed serious instability issues throughout the gorge. The result was an incredibly expensive gorge stabilization programme, costing $936 million dollars (2005 value), resulting in the total cost of the project blowing-out to $1.4-1.8 billion dollars. The exact cost is unavailable or unknown, suggesting the true cost could be even higher.

There was considerable doubt over whether or not the dam would be safe, but in the end the government of the day, under Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, refused to admit that the project had been botched, and it was finished, complete with a controversial 'slip-joint' to accommodate earthquakes up to, supposedly, 7 on the Richter Scale.

The 'slip-joint' was hailed as an engineering achievement, but one of New Zealand's most respected geo-technical scientists at the time, Gerald Lensen, insisted that it was designed incorrectly, because the River Channel Fault is 'tensional' (pulling apart) and not 'lateral' (slipping sideways). Needless to say, this fact has been kept quiet ever since.

Now, according to GNS scientists, the 'big one' is overdue along the Alpine Fault (bigger than the 7.8 Fiordland quake in July 2009). Meantime, the 6,500 measuring and monitoring stations quietly observe the landslide movements, reduced but not stopped, and visible silting up continues in the Kawarau Arm at an alarming rate estimated to be 1.46 million cubic metres per year, building up the reservoir bed profile by an estimated 1.85m annually.

The Decline of Large Hydro

In the 21st century, energy that is "renewable" is defined as energy from a source that is both naturally replenishing and environmentally safe and sustainable. The term “new” renewable energy has also been used to define the latest wave of renewable technologies that are truly environmentally sustainable.

By such standards, hydropower over 10 MW is no longer considered renewable because the negative impacts of large hydropower outweigh the so-called renewable benefits, which have inherent limitations.

In New Zealand, we are told that to maintain our present society and standard of living we need a minimum increase in power availability of 2.5% per annum (peak power), with 170 MW of new generation added each year. Based on this figure, we would need the equivalent of one Luggate dam (86 MW) every 6 months, or one Tuapeka dam (350 MW) every 25 months, or another Clyde dam (432 MW) every 29 months. Clearly, this is not a credible long-term solution.

World-wide, large hydropower declined in the 1990s because of mounting opposition that culminated in the World Commission on Dams report (2000), which acknowledged that large dams do not meet best practice guidelines in the water and energy sector. The global recession spurred more large dam projects, especially in developing countries, but the tide has turned and large hydro is again in decline as new renewable technologies sweep the world.

The intrinsic problems associated with large dams have long been glossed over. Hydroelectricity is often falsely promoted as cheap and reliable. While the operating costs of hydroelectric dams can be relatively low, their construction costs are extremely high, running into the billions of dollars for major projects. They are also prone to cost overruns. The WCD (World Commission on Dams, 2000) found that on average dams cost 56% more than forecast. And 55% of the hydroelectric projects studied by the WCD generated less power than planners promised.

New Zealand's Clyde dam is an obvious example of disastrous cost overruns. According to the public record, the 1982 winning bid from the joint venture of W. Williamson & Co. of Christchurch and Ed. Zublin AG of Stuttgart, was $102.6 million. Ten years later when the dam began producing power, the cost had climbed to $1.4 – 1.8 billion. Conversely, the planned generation of 612 MW had fallen to an actual capacity of 432 MW.

Typically, construction and mitigation costs are under-estimated, long-term costs are ignored, the value of the proposed dam and mitigation measures are inflated, while the value of the current and potential benefits from the existing environment are under-reported.

The proponents of large dams also invariably claim that large hydropower is "green" energy. However, the carbon footprint of a large-scale hydro project is anything but "green". A comparative study at the University of Auckland found that large hydro has a full-life carbon footprint that is 2.5 times larger than that of tidal energy.

A similar comparative study in the U.K. found that in terms of grams of CO2 equivalent per kWh of electricity generated, large hydro in the U.K. comes in with a carbon footprint 2 to 6 times larger than that of wind power. Specifically, large hydro has been measured at 10-30gCO2eq/kWh while wind has been measured at only 4.64gCO2eq/kWh, the lowest except for nuclear (Carbon Footprint of Electricity Generation, 2006).

It is easy to understand why large dams rate so poorly. For example, the Clyde dam contains 1 million cubic metres of concrete, equivalent to about 3 million tonnes. Manufacturing one tonne of cement requires 4.7 million BTU’s of energy, which is the amount contained in about 170 litres of oil or 190 kilograms of coal. Obviously, this combined with emissions from machinery involved in earthworks for foundations, roading, terrain forming, landslide mitigation, and through the loss of river corridor carbon sink forests or vegetation, adds up to an enormous carbon footprint.

There are over 54,000 large dams in the world, some 5,000 of which are over 50 years old. The typical design-life of such dams is 80 years, and an increasing number of old dams are being classified as high risk. It is a telling fact that more dams are being decommissioned than built in the U.S., but dam owners typically avoid decommissioning issues and try to evade the considerable costs associated with dam removal and river restoration. This scenario points to a looming dam safety crisis.

In the past, the benefits of large dams were viewed as outweighing their obvious short and long-term environmental impacts. That has changed.

Large hydropower once represented the epitome of 20th Century technology and a passport to prosperity, projecting a misguided belief that Nature could be controlled without consequences. In the 21st Century, we face a new reality, for which 20th Century energy solutions are unacceptable.

Roxburgh Dam Decommissioning?

The Roxburgh dam was commissioned in 1956, and it is New Zealand's oldest concrete gravity dam. Such dams have a design lifespan of 80-100 years, but the actual lifespan of a dam depends on the rate at which its reservoir fills with sediment. Assessing the remaining life of a dam and reservoir is complex, but reservoir flooding events indicate that time is running out.

When other issues are added to the picture, questions must be asked.

The Roxburgh dam - like the Clyde dam, has faultine and landslide issues that are potentially catastrophic (something which has been kept quiet). However, when the Roxburgh dam was built, there was minimal geotechnical investigation and mitigation undertaken, despite obvious evidence of major landslides in the Roxburgh Gorge, notably at Island Basin.

But reservoir sedimentation is the most problematic issue. In fact, within 15 years of the dam's commissioning, the dam's two low level sluice gates were inoperable, and since then the silt burden has filled much of the Roxburgh reservoir reaching back to Alexandra. In 1995, ECNZ estimated that 1.5 million cubic metres of silt had entered the Roxburgh reservoir every year before the Clyde dam was built, and that a total 50 million cubic metres of silt had accumulated in the reservoir, raising the bed profile 'considerably'. Attempts to 'flush' the silt have had little effect, and have not reversed this process. This is probably because of the 'Gates of the Gorge,' a narrow bottleneck just below Alexandra.

As a result, Alexandra has become flood-prone, and has installed flood defence walls along the river. But even these will not be high enough to prevent future flooding, because the riverbed will gradually keep rising. It was thought that by building the Clyde dam that this sedimentation problem would be largely solved, but some silt still gets through to continue choking the reservoir and river, and the Manuherikia River still contributes silt when it is high.

Efforts continue to "buy time" for the Roxburgh dam. More "flushing" will only move some of the sediment load further toward the dam. (Flushing has failed to remove sediment wherever it has been tried, including on the Colorado.) Physically removing millions of cubic metres of sediment is not practicable because of the costs involved. An interim measure is to remove some sediment from the Manuherikia confluence, and also from the Galloway area, but this does not address the major constriction at the 'Gates of the Gorge.'

The most desperate strategy is to raise the operating level of the Roxburgh reservoir, and this was done in 2009 when a rise of .6m was consented. While this allows water to reach the dam more easily, it also increases the risks associated with flooding events, both at Alexandra and the dam. In the life cycle of a dam, this is the "Russian roulette phase."

The dam owners and the Crown must face up to the fact that the Roxburgh dam and reservoir will not last forever, and that enormous risks are imposed on communities in the meantime. A feasibility study is needed to determine the most effective decommissioning and de-silting methodology. Where such dam removal projects have been undertaken overseas, the costs as a proportion of construction, range from 35% to 150%.

However, since there has been no provision for the ultimate decommissioning of the Roxburgh dam (typical of the hydropower industry), there is something of a head-in-the-sediment policy on this issue.

Questions should be asked, including the most difficult question of all ... when the time comes to decommission the dam, who will pay?
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